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S
ince this nation’s founding, central
bank independence (CBI) has
been a contentious and often-
misunderstood issue. Our government
and national character were formed in
reaction to monarchy and centralized
power, yet from the First and Second
Banks of the United States to the
current Federal Reserve System, central
banks have played key economic and
political roles at various points in history. 
These banks have been attacked
for being both too powerful and inde-
pendent of the political structure, as
well  as  for being too partisan in
setting economic policy. Only through
extensive trial-and-error experimen-
tation, as well as significant economic
scholarship, has the proper role of a
central bank within a constitutional
framework become understood and
widely accepted. 
Economists, policymakers, and
journalists frequently make reference
to “central bank independence,” but
what is meant by this term? There is
no consensus as to what the definition
of CBI ought to be (see sidebar), yet
broadly speaking, independence is the
ability of the bank to formulate and
carry out monetary policy as best it
can without political intervention.
Independence is a complex blend of
the bank’s enumerated powers, its
structure, and its leadership, as well
as many other factors. 
Central bank independence is
important because it allows the gov-
ernment to commit credibly to a
program of low inflation. On their
own, governments have a strong infla-
tionary bias; they often will try to
boost output and employment in the
short run for political gain, even
though eventually such policies lead
to inflation, not sustained growth. 
Inflation can also act as a source of
revenue for governments, further
tempting them. Even if a government
promises not to inflate, the public may
remain skeptical, producing high infla-
tionary expectations. By delegating
responsibility for money creation to a
central bank, the legislature can
remove the temptation to abuse its
power and pursue bad monetary
policy for short-run gain. (It is impor-














Chairman Paul Volcker talks
with Sen. Paul Sarbanes of
Maryland prior to a 1979
Senate hearing on monetary
policy. The Federal Reserve 
is formally independent 
of the executive and
legislative branches, but 
the President appoints the
Fed’s chairman, who must




















Sinflate is particularly acute in a system
of fiat money. When a nation’s cur-
rency is backed by a commodity, such
as gold, the ability of the government
to inflate at will is limited. Of course,
such commodity-backed systems have
their downsides as well.)
The Federal Reserve System clearly
demonstrates this delegation of mon-
etary authority by a legislature to a
central bank. The Fed is ultimately a
child of Congress, to which the chair-
man must report regularly, but it is
free to pursue monetary policy as it
sees fit. As economist Allan Meltzer
of Carnegie Mellon University puts it,
“The Fed is independent within
government, not independent from
government.”
Modern ideas about the impor-
tance of central bank independence in
maintaining good monetary policy
took a long time to develop, with
many missteps along the way. After
two initial experiments in central
banking, the United States went
almost 80 years with no central bank.
These early banks failed due to fears
that they were too powerful, too
corrupt, and too free from govern-
ment oversight.
During the Revolutionary War, the
fledgling U.S. government had diffi-
culty financing wartime expenditures
and resorted to excessive printing of
continental dollars. (This is how the
phrase “not worth a continental” orig-
inated.) This prompted the founding
of the First Bank of the United States
(FBUS) in 1791, a private bank with
some special privileges to finance 
government debt. Though the FBUS
worked reasonably well, its charter
was not renewed in 1811 largely due to
the belief that such an institution did 
not have an explicit constitutional
mandate and fears that it wielded too
much financial power. 
After the United States once again
experienced credit problems during
the War of 1812, the Second Bank of
the United States (SBUS) was char-
tered in 1816. The SBUS was not con-
ceived as a central bank in the modern
sense, though it soon evolved to fill
that role during the 20 years of its
initial charter. It was fairly successful
in its attempts to regulate and stabi-
lize the nascent U.S. banking industry.
When the time came, however, for
the bank to be rechartered, President
Andrew Jackson and Nicholas Biddle,
head of the SBUS, argued fiercely
about the Bank’s place in U.S. gover-
nance. Jackson complained that the
bank was run for the private interests
of its shareholders and was not pro-
vided for by the Constitution. Biddle
countered by arguing that a central
bank was effective and justified, and
should be separated in powers from
the government, which might abuse
its role in the financial system. Ulti-
mately, Biddle lost the fight, and with
it the Bank. The United States had no
central banking authority until the
Federal Reserve System was founded
in 1913.
The Birth of the Modern Fed
The story of the modern Fed really
begins in 1934, in the midst of the
Great Depression. After its apparent
failure to avert the economic disaster
of the 1930s, the Fed subordinated its
policy role to the U.S. Treasury. Once
World War II broke out, the Fed
further sacrificed independence, prop-
ping up government debt by holding
interest rates constant. This policy
was both inflationary and limiting
since it prevented the Fed from taking
other monetary actions. After the war
was over, the Treasury as well as Pres-
ident Truman wanted the Fed to con-
tinue supporting their fiscal policies,
but there were critics within the Fed
of continuing this arrangement, and
eventually the conflict escalated into
open argument as each side publicly
contradicted the other about the
direction of U.S. monetary policy.
The dispute was finally resolved by
the signing of the Treasury-Federal
Reserve Accord of 1951. In the Accord,
both parties agreed that the Fed
should be the sole conductor of mon-
etary policy. The disengagement of
monetary from fiscal policy in effect
allowed the Fed to gain back the inde-
pendence it had lost during the war.
In the period immediately following
the Accord, the modern character and
role of the Fed were formed under the
chairmanship of William McChesney
Martin. According to Robert Hetzel,
a senior economist at the Federal
Reserve Bank of Richmond, “What
happened after the Accord was that
Martin gave effective substance to the
federal character of the Reserve
System by bringing in regional bank
presidents as key members of the
FOMC. So while there was no change
in the law concerning Fed independ-
ence, there was an institutional
change.” Furthermore, the Accord saw
the Fed commit to “lean against the
wind” — that is, to adopt monetary
policy with the intention of smooth-
ing out business cycle fluctuations. 
Since 1951, the results of Fed policy
have been highly variable. During the
1950s and early ’60s, inflation was 
low and steady. But in the late 1960s
and much of the ’70s, the United
States suffered from high and variable
inflation along with high rates of
unemployment. Fortunately, since the
early 1980s, inflation has been gener-
ally quite low, and it seems that price
stability finally has been achieved.
Some economists have suggested that
at least some of this variation in per-
formance should be attributed to
occasional partisan political interven-
tion by the Fed.
Others argue that the Fed simply
did not have sufficient economic
understanding during these bad spells
to  formulate effective policy. For
instance, under the chairmanship of
Arthur Burns (1970-1978), the Federal
Reserve often pursued unwise mone-
tary policies. Persistently high inflation
coupled with economic stagnation,
derogatorily dubbed “stagflation,” char-
acterized Burns’ tenure.
Economists like Richard Timber-
lake of the University of Georgia
think that Burns’ Fed was clearly
politically active. Timberlake argues
that by keeping monetary policy loose
throughout 1971, despite rising infla-
tion, Burns boosted President Nixon’s
chances at re-election in 1972 by arti-
ficially stimulating the economy. “He
[Burns] made the Fed, at least as far
as he had control of it, an aide of the
Nixon Administration,” Timberlake
says. He further cites Burns’ unortho-
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controls in an effort to curb inflation.
Other economists such as Hetzel
counter that, though misguided,
Burns’ policies were failures of eco-
nomic understanding and leadership,
not of political independence. He
argues that most of Burns’ policy blun-
ders were foreseeable results of his
previously stated economic beliefs —
which, in large measure, were repre-
sentative of the economics commu-
nity generally during this period. As
Marvin Goodfriend, an economist and
senior vice president at the Richmond
Fed, points out, “The central bank
cannot be expected to do better than
the economists.”
In  addition to hewing to ques-
tionable economic theories, Burns
also changed his outlook and expla-
nations frequently. This had the unin-
tended policy effect of making it
more difficult for businesses to
understand and predict which poli-
cies the Fed was likely to pursue. This
combination of loose policy, high
inflationary expectations, and dimin-
ished Fed credibility set the stage for
stagflation.
The quality of Fed monetary policy
has improved markedly over the last two
decades under the leadership of Paul
Volcker and Alan Greenspan. For
instance, during the presidential election
in 1980, Volcker drastically tightened
monetary policy. This put an end to infla-
tion, although it caused a short but
severe recession. Such actions seem to
indicate that the Fed is more able, or at
least more willing, to follow good policy
regardless of political repercussions.
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The chief problem facing economists seeking to understand
the effect of central bank independence (CBI) on economic
performance is the difficulty in ranking and comparing 
CBI across countries. Unlike many economic variables, inde-
pendence is not simply a number, but instead a
loosely defined concept dependent upon the
specific institutional, legal, and cultural
framework within which a particular
central bank operates. No two coun-
tries, or their central banks, are alike.
Essentially, researchers must find a way
to compare apples to oranges.
Economists generally break inde-
pendence down into two subcategories,
political and economic, which they can
then examine separately or in combi-
nation. Political independence is the
degree to which a central bank is insu-
lated from short-term political censure.
Infrequent appointments of bank direc-
tors, legally mandated independence,
and other institutional arrangements
are taken to correspond with high polit-
ical independence. 
Compared to other countries’
central banks, the Fed has a good deal
of political independence. It can
conduct policy that is contrary to the
wishes of Congress (at least until Con-
gress decides to change the law gov-
erning the Fed). Additionally, the
chairman of the Fed serves a 14-year
term, thus isolating him somewhat
from political threats to his job. At the
same time, informal bonds between members of the Fed and
elected officials may jeopardize independence at times. For
instance, some have argued that former Fed Chairman Arthur
Burns’ friendship with President Nixon may have informally
decreased the Fed’s independence from the executive branch. 
Economic independence is the central bank’s ability to
effectively enact any monetary policy it may decide is best.
The Fed now has economic independence since it has direct
control over the implements of monetary
policy, but did not through part of its history.
Until the Treasury-Fed Accord of
1951, the Fed was required to support
the nation’s fiscal policy, which
removed a huge array of options
from its policy palette.
Attempts to rigorously analyze
CBI are complicated further by cul-
tural factors extending beyond mere
institutional and legal arrangements.
For instance, a country with a long
tradition of deference to authority
may have a less independent central
bank in practice, regardless of how
independent it looks on paper.
Determining the cultural attitudes
toward central banking within a
given country requires intimate
knowledge of its history and national
identity.
Studies showing a correspondence
between CBI and low inflation, then,
need to be taken with a grain of salt.
The indices used are generally quite
crude. The most popular consist of 
a simple 1 to 4 ranking, and may be
subject to researcher bias. Encour-
agingly, though, researchers have
found similar results using a wide
array of ranking schema, indicating that though the specifics
may be difficult to measure, there is a real underlying 















The Treasury and 
the Federal Reserve System 
have reached full accord 
with respect to policies 
to be pursued in furthering 
their common purpose 
to assure the 
successful financing 
of the Government’s 
requirements and, 
at the same time, 
to minimize monetization 
of the public debt.What the Data Say
A great deal of theoretical and empir-
ical investigation tentatively indicates
that some form of CBI does indeed
have beneficial long-run effects. For
instance, economist Alberto Alesina of
Harvard University has used various
methods to quantify independence and
has found that, across a wide sample of
countries,  greater CBI tends to corre-
spond to lower and less variable infla-
tion. At the same time, research also
indicates that CBI has little effect on
other important economic variables
such as GDP growth.
Like all research, these results come
with major caveats. As discussed in the
sidebar, it is very hard to come up with
a ranking of independence across coun-
tries. Though the correlation between
high CBI and low inflation holds for a
wide array of independence indices, the
strength of the results does change.
Although economists and policy-
makers have made great strides in
understanding the economic importance
of CBI, there is still much work to 
be done. There are now major propos-
als being discussed to further 
institutionalize the Fed’s independence
and help protect it from potential crises.
The most prominent suggestion
advocated by many monetary econo-
mists is that the Fed adopt an explicit
inflation target as its primary opera-
tional goal. Under an inflation target,
the Fed would simply pursue whatever
monetary policies were necessary to
maintain inflation at the desired level. 
Over the last 20 years, the Fed has
focused most of its energies on main-
taining low inflation, yet there is
nothing in the mandate of the Fed
requiring that it make inflation its main
priority. As Goodfriend puts it, “You
want an inflation target to guard
against the bad old days of high infla-
tion. Independence becomes moot if
the Fed follows an inflation target
because it will be held accountable to
something. Holding inflation constant
would completely determine Fed policy
— there would be no degrees of
freedom to do anything else.” 
In addition to a publicly stated infla-
tion target against which actual Fed per-
formance could be compared, the Fed
might also want to make its operating
procedures more transparent. “The issue
for the Fed is that it is not enough that
we have oversight hearings in Congress.
We also have a responsibility to conduct
monetary policy in a way that allows
easy monitoring by the public,” says
Hetzel. “It is incumbent upon us to
make policy in a way that is in the spirit
of a constitutional democracy.”
An explicit inflation target mandate
for the Fed would also help it surmount
another potentially difficult issue: that
of succession and leadership. Many
economists now see the  leadership of
the chairman as vital to Fed success. 
“A lot of the credibility of the Federal
Reserve System rests in the person of
the Federal Reserve Chairman because
we don’t have any institutional require-
ments to target low and stable inflation,”
Hetzel says. “There is no obvious answer
to how well we would work under a poor
leader.” As a result, some fear that when
Greenspan retires, a lot of the faith in
the effectiveness of the Federal Reserve
System will retire with him.
Marvin Goodfriend and Robert
Hetzel are not especially concerned,
though. Goodfriend stresses that, over
the last 20 years, a consensus has
emerged within the economics com-
munity that the Fed should primarily
strive to maintain low inflation. Such
agreement effectively limits the oppor-
tunities for politicians to push for devi-
ations from best practice behavior.
“Intellectuals matter, when they are
united,” Goodfriend says.
New Pressures to Inflate?
Questions about the Fed’s independence
and ability to stave off political pressure
may become particularly pressing in the
near future. Laurence Kotlikoff of
Boston University and Scott Burns of the
Dallas Morning News argue in their new
book,  The Coming Generational Storm,
that in the next 30 years, the Social Secu-
rity and Medicare systems will come
under tremendous pressure as the baby
boom generation reaches retirement age.
These programs’ liabilities are close to
12 times the current national debt, Kot-
likoff and Burns estimate.
Without a large increase in the size
or productivity of the American work
force, the government will have 
difficulty financing these expensive 
programs through the conventional
means of taxation and borrowing. 
Kotlikoff and Timberlake fear that the
Fed will be put under tremendous 
pressure by the political branches to 
use inflation to pay down this debt.
Another potential source for polit-
ical pressure on the Fed comes from
hard-to-predict geopolitical events
such as terrorism. Several studies have
shown that terrorism imposes enor-
mous costs on the U.S. economy. In the
wake of 9/11, the Fed drastically loos-
ened monetary policy to help the
economy rebound. That action has
seemed to work, but a particularly
severe attack in the future may prompt
politicians to pressure the Fed into
unsound monetary practices.
Such potential pressures on good
monetary policy give the issue of
central bank independence new rele-
vance. The economic performance of
the coming decades could hinge in part
on how well the Fed can insulate itself
from political machinations in the face
of extreme circumstances. RF
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